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[CCICADA-announce] Special CCICADA/DIMACS Seminar - Thursday, March 28, 2013

Linda Casals lindac at dimacs.rutgers.edu
Thu Mar 28 08:41:08 EDT 2013


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Special CCICADA/DIMACS Seminar
              
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Special CCICADA/DIMACS Seminar

Title: Policy Tool Bundling: Predicting the Selection of Policy
       Instruments Using a Bayesian Multivariate Probit Model 

Speaker: Anthony J. Kassekert, Dept. of Homeland Security and Florida State University

Date: Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:15 - 2:15 PM

Location: CoRE Building, Room 431, Busch Campus, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

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Abstract: 

Local governments have a vast array of economic development policy
options available to spur growth and/or provide political patronage to
local constituencies. In theorizing why governments choose a
particular incentive over another, the policy sciences have developed
general theories for these incentives including the policy tools
framework and policy diffusion. Both theories have generated insight
into the individual determinants of the policy selection but have
overlooked interdependencies between policy options and why they may
be bundled together. This research builds on the political science
theories of diffusion and policy tools to explain why multiple tools
are used in conjunction with one another to solve public problems. I
theorize that policy bundling is strategic by local officials,
incentivized by political institutions, and heavily influenced by
previous policy decisions.

The theory of policy tool bundling is empirically tested using panel
data from the state of Georgia. The presence of policy tool bundling
is assessed by modeling four economic incentives simultaneously with a
multivariate probit (MVP) model estimated using Bayesian methods. A
MVP model allows for a series of binary outcomes models to be
correlated with each other. The correlations are used as indications
of policy bundling. The results demonstrate that bundling is occurring
between free or reduced cost land and expedited permitting and also
between free or reduced cost land and industrial development bonds. No
evidence of bundling was found between other incentives indicating
that while policy bundling does occur in economic development, many of
the observed relationships between policies are not strategic.

No knowledge of policy theories or statistical methods will be
expected prior to attending. The presentation will be applied and will
exhibit all requisite information. Questions and feedback are
welcomed.

Background:

Anthony Kassekert is a Courtesy Professor with Florida State's
Institute for Energy Systems, Economics, and Sustainability (IESES)
and a statistician with the Department of Homeland Security's Office
of Strategy, Planning, Analysis, & Risk. His professional interests
include immigration policy, performance measurement, sustainable
energy policy, federalism studies, and applied statistics.
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